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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.
Must a student who has already graduated from high school
exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing a civil action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act if she is only seeking monetary damages, which are not available under
IDEA?
II. Does a defendant's failure to renew a motion for judgment as a
matter of law at the close of all of the evidence bar a post-verdict motion
for renewed judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b)?
OPINION BELOW
The opinion and judgments of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbus have not been officially reported, but they are
available in the Transcript of the Record (R. 12, 30).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
A formal statement of jurisdiction has been omitted pursuant to the
rules of the Northern Illinois University College of Law Second Year Moot
Court Program.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Lori Busch, a 19-year-old female who has been diagnosed with
Tourette's Syndrome and emotional problems, commenced this action on
November 1, 2003, alleging that Clark County Independent School District
(the School District), the Defendants, deprived Ms. Busch of her right to a
free and appropriate education, in violation of the Constitution and the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. On December 1, 2003, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbus denied the
Defendants' motion to dismiss, thereby finding that Lori Busch was not
required to exhaust administrative processes before filing a § 1983 suit for
monetary damages. In further proceedings, a jury awarded Ms. Busch
$435,000 for lost educational opportunities and emotional distress. The
Defendant-Petitioners now appeal from the court's decision denying the
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Defendant-Petitioners' motion to dismiss and its decision denying the
Defendant-Petitioners' motion for judgment as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Lori Busch, a 19-year-old female who was diagnosed on August 22,
1998, with Tourette's Syndrome and emotional problems (R. 2), attended
Washington High School (the High School) for two years, from August
2000 until her graduation in May 2002. (R. 3). The High School is located
in Clarktown, Columbus, and is part of the Clark County Independent
School District, which receives federal financial assistance and is charged
with administering the state system of public education within Clark
County. (R. 2). As required by 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a), the School District is
responsible for providing full and equal access to the public educational
programs and activities offered within its jurisdiction. (R. 2). In August
2000, the School District determined that Ms. Busch was eligible to receive
special education services. (R. 3). Pursuant to the individualized education
program (IEP) prepared by the School District in compliance with the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ( DEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et
q., Lori Busch should have attended a single class for the entire day and
received intensive, one-on-one tutoring. (R. 3). According to the IEP, the
class was to consist entirely of special education students. (R. 3).
Although the IEP made no mention of peer tutoring, and Lori Busch's
parents were never consulted about and never consented to her peer
tutoring (R. 4), Ms. Busch was removed from the classroom for peer
tutoring by freshman and sophomore high school students. (R. 4, 17). No
certified teacher supervised the instruction that occurred each morning for
three hours. (R. 4, 17). The peer tutoring sessions caused Ms. Busch to
miss a significant portion of instruction by a certified teacher. (R. 4, 17).
Furthermore, the tutoring occurred on the benches in the High School's
central courtyard, which was visible to all of the classrooms in the main
building. (R. 4, 18). Thus, Lori Busch's classmates were able to and did
watch her being tutored, which caused the students to mock Ms. Busch and
frequently refer to her as "Loser Lori." (R. 4, 18). Ms. Busch repeatedly
approached Defendant-Petitioner Howard Edwards, a classroom instructor,
and requested that there be no more courtyard counseling. (R. 4). Edwards
did not respond to Ms. Busch's requests. (R. 4) Furthermore, DefendantPetitioners Carol Brown, Director of Program Development in the School
District, and Jeb Hart, the High School's principal, did nothing to ensure
that Lori Busch, as a student with disabilities, was treated in compliance
with the requirements of state and federal law. (R. 4). As a result, not only
did the Defendant-Petitioners deny Lori Busch an adequate education, but
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they also caused Ms. Busch mental and emotional suffering, humiliation,
shame, and embarrassment. (R. 5, 17).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Lori Busch, a graduate of Washington High School, does not need to
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a suit for monetary
damages under § 1983 because the plain language of § 1415(l) of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) does not require
exhaustion when seeking monetary relief, and because exhaustion would be
futile in her situation.
The lower court correctly held that under the plain meaning of §
1415(l), Lori Busch is not required to exhaust administrative remedies
before filing her § 1983 suit because she is seeking monetary relief, which
is not relief also available under the IDEA. In order to determine whether
exhaustion is required under the IDEA when a party is seeking monetary
relief, the court must first look to the plain language of the statute. Since
the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous as to the point that
exhaustion is only required when a party is seeking relief also available
under the IDEA and money is not an available remedy, the lower court is
correct in holding that Ms. Busch does not have to exhaust administrative
proceedings. Even though the practical aspects of exhaustion are supported
by strong rationale, in looking at the plain language of § 1415(l), it is clear
that Congress did not intend for exhaustion to be an inflexible requirement.
Because Congress specifically stated that § 1415(l) is not a rigid
requirement, the lower court was also correct in holding that it would be
futile for Lori Busch to exhaust the statutory administrative process.
Exhaustion is futile and therefore not required when a student's injury is in
the past and monetary compensation is the only relief available that could
suffice to remedy that past harm. Such is the case for Ms. Busch. She has
already graduated from Washington High School, the peer-tutoring
sessions have terminated, and monetary relief is all that can make her
whole. Since Lori Busch is no longer a student in the Clark County
Independent School District, she cannot benefit from the counseling and
tutoring services that the Defendant-Petitioners may have to offer. Also, in
viewing the specific facts of Ms. Busch's case, it is clear that she and her
parents did not wait to file the suit after graduation as a way of opting out
of the administrative process. Her parents were never made aware of her
curriculum change as required under the IDEA. Because they were
unaware of the situation, they were unable to fix the problem at the time
that it existed. Furthermore, Lori Busch tried to remedy the situation by
requesting that Defendant-Petitioner Edwards remove her from peertutoring sessions.
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For the foregoing reasons, this court should affirm the lower court's
decision in permitting Lori Busch to seek monetary relief under § 1983
without exhausting the administrative process prescribed in the IDEA.
Likewise, the court should also affirm the district court's decision in
denying the Defendant-Petitioners' motion to dismiss and motion for
judgment as a matter of law, thereby entitling Ms. Busch to monetary
relief.
In failing to renew its motion for judgment as a matter of law at the
close of all of the evidence, the Defendant-Petitioners are barred from a
post-verdict motion for renewed judgment as a matter of the law. The
court is bound by the plain language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
50(b), which requires that judgment as a matter of law be renewed at the
close of all evidence in the case. Based on the reading of Rule 50(b) by its
advisory committee, courts must strictly interpret the plain language of
Rule 50(b) by requiring that a motion for judgment as a matter of law be
made at the close of all evidence in order to be preserved for post-trial
consideration.
Rule 50(b) serves two essential purposes: to enable the
trial court to examine all of the evidence before submitting the question to
the jury, and to alert the opposing party to any defect in its case, thereby
affording it an opportunity to cure any defects in proof should the motion
have merit. This latter purpose is not achieved if the defendant makes a
motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the plaintiff's case,
but does not renew the motion at the close of all of the evidence after the
original motion is denied. In such a situation, the plaintiff may assume that
the denial was the end of the matter. By renewing the motion, the
defendant shows that the denial was not the end of the matter, and the
plaintiff may ask and may receive permission from the judge to put on
some additional evidence to show that there is a jury issue. Hence, the
plaintiff is not prejudiced by having lost the opportunity to present
additional evidence before the case was submitted to the jury.
The only deviation for which noncompliance with Rule 50(b) has been
excused is when the court takes a defendant's motion for judgment as a
matter of law (made before the close of all the evidence) under advisement
and does not rule on the motion before the case is submitted to the jury. In
such a case, counsel may reasonably assume that the court has the motion
under continuous advisement and that the motion need not be restated.
Thus, the plaintiff is aware at the end of trial that the issue is live, and he or
she can put on additional evidence after the defendant's case if deemed
necessary. Hence there is no lost opportunity to submit additional
evidence.
When the court does not take a defendant's motion for judgment as a
matter of law under advisement, and the defendant fails to renew its motion
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at the end of all of the evidence, the defendant waives its renewed motion
for judgment as a matter of law.
For the foregoing reasons, this court should affirm the district court's
decision in denying the Defendant-Petitioners' motion to dismiss and
motion for judgment as a matter of law, thereby entitling Ms. Busch to
monetary relief.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT A
STUDENT WHO HAS ALREADY GRADUATED HIGH SCHOOL
DOES NOT HAVE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
PROVIDED BY THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
BEFORE FILING A SUIT FOR MONETARY DAMAGES UNDER 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
Lori Busch, a graduate of Washington High School, does not need to
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a suit for monetary
damages under § 1983 because the plain language of § 1415(l) of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) does not require
exhaustion when seeking monetary relief, and because exhaustion would be
futile in her situation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)
(2000).
Lori Busch should not be required to exhaust administrative remedies
before filing her § 1983 suit because she is seeking monetary damages,
which are not also available under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1).
Since the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous as to the
fact that exhaustion is only required when a party is seeking relief also
available under the statute and money is not an available remedy, Ms.
Busch should not be required to exhaust administrative proceedings. See
Covington v. Knox County Sch. Sys., 205 F.3d 912 (6th Cir. 2000); W.B.
v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995). Even though the practical aspects of
exhaustion are supported by strong rationale, in looking at the plain
language of § 1415(l), it is clear that Congress did not intend for exhaustion
to be an inflexible requirement.
Because Congress specifically stated that § 1415(1) is not a rigid
requirement, the lower court was correct in holding that it would be futile
for Ms. Busch to exhaust administrative procedure because she has already
graduated high school, her injury is in the past, and monetary relief is the
only remedy that can make her whole. See Covington, 205 F.3d 912 (6th
Cir. 2000); Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995); Witte v. Clark County Sch.
Dist., 197 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 1999). Ms. Busch, therefore, respectfully
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requests that this court affirm the decision of the district court in permitting
Ms. Busch to bypass exhaustion of the administrative process. The proper
standard of review to determine whether exhaustion of administrative
process is required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act is
de novo because it involves a question of law. Witte, 197 F.3d at 1274.
A. THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT BASED
ON THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT A STUDENT WHO IS SEEKING MONETARY
DAMAGES NEED NOT EXHAUST ALL ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES BECAUSE SHE IS SEEKING RELIEF THAT IS NOT
AVAILABLE UNDER THE IDEA.
Lori Busch is only seeking monetary damages; therefore, she does not
have to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 because the plain language of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) only requires exhaustion when a party is
seeking relief that is "also available" under the statute. 20 U.S.C. §
1415(l). Monetary relief is not available in the IDEA proceeding; therefore,
See
the respondent need not exhaust all administrative remedies.
Covington, 205 F.3d at 918 (stating that monetary damages are unavailable
through the IDEA administrative process); Matula, 67 F.3d at 494-96
(holding that monetary damages are not available under the IDEA;
however, they are available under § 1983 to remedy an IDEA violation).
The IDEA was enacted to "ensure that all children with disabilities
have available to them a free appropriate public education" and "to ensure
that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are
protected." 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d)(1)(A) and (B). To guarantee such rights
are protected, the IDEA prescribes administrative procedures that can be
taken, including: examination of all records relating to the child; written
notice of proposed changes in education placement; and an opportunity to
present complaints regarding the appropriateness of the child's educational
program. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a),(b). Furthermore, an aggrieved party has
the right to file a civil suit if the party is dissatisfied with the results of the
administrative procedures. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e). Section 1415(1) requires
an individual to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a civil
action if the individual is seeking "relief that is also available" through the
IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
Several courts have addressed the issue of whether administrative
remedies must be exhausted when an aggrieved party is seeking relief
beyond that which is available through the IDEA. In interpreting § 1415(l),
the court must start by looking at the language of the statute itself. See,
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e.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,
108 (1980) (applying the plain meaning rule to determine Congress' intent
behind § 6(b)(1) of the Consumer Product Safety Act). "Absent a clearly
expressed legislative intention to the contrary," the language must be
viewed as conclusive. Id. In viewing the plain meaning of § 1415(l),
courts have examined the language of the statement "relief that is also
available," and determined that exhaustion is only required when a party is
seeking relief that can be obtained under the IDEA. See Matula, 67 F.3d at
494-96; Covington, 205 F.3d at 918; Witte, 197 F.3d at 1275.
Furthermore, courts have concluded that because monetary damages are
not available under the IDEA, a student need not exhaust administrative
remedies before filing suit for such relief. Id.
In Matula, the plaintiff was seeking damages on behalf of her disabled
child for the "persistent refusal of school officials to evaluate, classify and
provide necessary educational services." 67 F.3d at 487. The court looked
at the plain meaning of the IDEA and stated that "it is apparent that the
exhaustion requirement is limited to actions seeking relief 'also available'
under IDEA." Id. at 496. Because the court determined that monetary
damages were not available under the IDEA, the court stated that the plain
terms of the statute do not require exhaustion where relief sought is
unavailable through administrative proceedings. Id. Likewise, the plaintiff
in Witte filed a suit on behalf of her ten-year-old son because of the
physical and mental abuse that he received from his teachers and school
officials. 197 F.3d at 1272-74. The plaintiff sought monetary damages
because the child no longer attended the defendant school. Id. In
determining whether the plaintiff could bypass administrative exhaustion,
the court in Witte further supported the notion from Matula, stating that
"under the plain words of the statute, exhaustion of administrative remedies
is not required." 197 F.3d at 1275.
Like the plaintiffs in Matula and Witte, Lori Busch is seeking relief
that is not "also available" under the IDEA. She is seeking monetary
damages for the humiliation and pain that she previously suffered as a
result of the Defendant-Petitioners' practice of making her attend peertutoring sessions in the open courtyard in view of her fellow students. (R.
4). The statute is clear and unambiguous as to when exhaustion is required.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). It is only required when a party is seeking relief
also available under the IDEA. Matula, 67 F.3d at 496. Reading the plain
meaning of the language of § 1415(1), Lori Busch must only exhaust
administrative remedies if she is seeking relief already available through
the IDEA. See Matula, 67 F.3d at 496; Witte, 197 F.3d at 1275. If
Congress intended for aggrieved parties to exhaust administrative remedies
in all situations, it would have stated such. See Consumer Prod. Safety
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Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 108. To the contrary, Congress made it clear that the
language of § 1415(l) is not meant to make exhaustion an inflexible
requirement. See S. Rep. No. 99-112, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1805. Rather, Congress stated that
there are times when exhaustion is not necessary. Id. Furthermore,
Congress expressly stated that the purpose of the IDEA is to "ensure that
the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are
protected." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Such protection
includes monetary relief. See Matula, 67 F.3d at 494-95. By the plain
meaning of § 1415(l), Lori Busch need not exhaust administrative remedies
because she is seeking monetary damages, which are beyond the
boundaries of the IDEA.
Several courts, including the First, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits,
have held that even though an aggrieved party is seeking relief beyond that
which is provided by the IDEA, administrative remedies must still be
exhausted in order to fulfill the practical aspects of the requirement. See
Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 64 (1st Cir. 2002); N.B. v.
Alachua County Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1378-79 (11th Cir. 1996).
However, these courts have made such judgments without adhering to the
true meaning of the language in the statute. See generally Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 108 (holding that when interpreting statutory
language, the court must first look at the plain meaning of the language).
In Frazier, a former high school student with learning disabilities sought
monetary damages for her ill treatment while attending school. 276 F.3d at
57. The court denied her damages under § 1983 because she had not
exhausted administrative remedies under the IDEA. Id. at 64. Likewise,
the court in Alachua County School Board stressed the importance of
exhaustion when deciding whether a hearing impaired student should
receive monetary damages based on IDEA violations by her prior school.
84 F.3d at 1378-79. The court denied her relief because she did not
exhaust administrative remedies. Id.
The courts in Frazier and Alachua County School Board determined
that exhaustion should be required even when a student is seeking relief
unavailable under the IDEA, but they did not look at the actual language of
§ 1415(l). Although the courts identify strong rationale for exhaustion, the
courts did not look at the plain language of the statute. In looking at the
plain meaning of the statute, it is clear that Congress did not intend for
exhaustion to be a rigid requirement. See generally S. Rep. No. 99-112 at
15 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1805 (stating that
exhaustion will be excused when resorting to administrative proceedings
would be futile).
Section 1415(l) only requires exhaustion of
administrative remedies when individuals are seeking relief also available
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under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). Monetary damages are not relief
available under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(2).
In viewing the plain meaning of § 1415(l), exhaustion is only required
when a party is seeking relief that is also available under the IDEA. Since
monetary damages are not available under the IDEA, Lori Busch should
not be required to exhaust the administrative process before seeking relief
under § 1983.
B. THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT A
STUDENT WHO HAS ALREADY COMPLETED HIGH SCHOOL
NEED NOT EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES UNDER THE
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT BECAUSE
SUCH A REQUIREMENT WOULD BE FUTILE.
Along with the fact that the plain language of § 1415(1) supports
bypassing exhaustion of administrative procedures when seeking monetary
relief unavailable through the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA),
Lori Busch should also be permitted to bypass the exhaustion requirement
because she is seeking relief unavailable under the IDEA; therefore,
exhaustion is futile. See Matula, 67 F.3d at 496 (citing Lester H. v.
Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 870 (3d Cir. 1990)). Legislative history makes it
clear that exhaustion is not required when it would be futile to resort to
administrative proceedings. S. Rep. No. 99-112 at 15 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1805. In Honig v. Doe, the Supreme Court
recognized that "parents may bypass the administrative process where
exhaustion would be futile or inadequate." 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988).
Exhaustion is futile and should be excused when the relief sought is not
available in an IDEA administrative proceeding, Matula, 67 F.3d at 496, or
if administration "persistently fails to render expeditious decisions as to a
child's educational placement." Frutiger v. Hamilton Cent. Sch. Dist., 928
F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1991). However, exhaustion of IDEA procedure is not
futile when the real problem is lack of specificity in the student's
individualized educational program (IEP), rather than failure to implement
the IEP. Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of the Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist.,
288 F.3d 478, 489-90 (2d Cir. 2002).
The Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuit Courts have held that exhaustion
of the IDEA process is futile when a party is seeking relief that is not
available through administrative proceeding. Matula, 67 F.3d at 496 (citing
Lester, 916 F.2d at 870); Covington, 205 F.3d at 917; Padilla v. Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 233 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000). In Covington, the plaintiff, a
high school graduate, sought monetary relief to redress his ill treatment
while attending school. 205 F.3d at 913-14. Covington was locked in a
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"time-out room" with no furniture, no heat, and no ventilation for several
hours at a time, and sustained physical injuries as a result of the
disciplinary measure. Id. His mother filed an administrative complaint on
his behalf, but before a due process hearing could be held, she filed a civil
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. The court held that exhaustion of
administrative procedure would be futile in Covington's situation because
he had already graduated from high school, his physical injuries were in the
past, and monetary damages was the only relief that could make him
whole. Id. at 917.
Exhaustion should not be required when a student's injury is in the
past and monetary damages are the only relief available that could suffice
to remedy that past harm. Covington, 205 F.3d at 917. As was the case in
Covington, the violation that was causing Ms. Busch's injury has ceased to
exist because she has graduated from Washington High School. (R. 3). In
Covington, the student sustained physical injuries as a result of the
disciplinary actions he received. 205 F.3d at 913-14. Likewise, because
Ms. Busch was required to attend peer-tutoring sessions with younger
students in the courtyard where other students could observe, Ms. Busch's
classmates subjected her to mental anguish and ridicule by calling her
"Loser Lori." (R. 4, 18). Like Covington's physical injuries, Ms. Busch's
mental injury is in the past and she can only be made whole through
monetary relief. (R. 5). There is nothing that the administration could
provide her to remedy her injury because Ms. Busch is no longer a student
in the Clark County Independent School District. (R. 5, 3). Although the
Defendant-Petitioners are probably required to provide their students with
counseling and tutoring to deal with psychological problems, these services
are of no benefit to Ms. Busch and cannot remedy her situation because she
has graduated and is now outside the school system and what it has to offer.
(R. 3).
Although courts have found that exhaustion is not futile when there is
other adequate relief that could remedy the situation, that is not the case
here. See Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist. 68, 98 F.3d 989
(7th Cir. 1996); Robb v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 308 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2002).
In Charlie F., a fourth-grade disabled student was subjected to humiliation
and ridicule by his classmates as a result of a teacher's policy of inviting
her pupils to express their complaints about Charlie. 98 F.3d at 990. His
parents eventually found out and moved him to another school, where he
was doing fine at the time of the proceeding. Id. at 990-91. The court
ruled that the administrative process should have been exhausted because
there was alternative relief available under the IDEA. Id. at 992. Although
Charlie F. was actually seeking monetary relief, the court found that
services to boost self esteem, such as counseling, would be an adequate
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remedy, and such relief would be available through the school system. Id.
Furthermore, the court stated that regardless of what damages were
permitted, they were not necessary because Charlie F. was doing fine at his
new school. Id. at 993. Likewise, the court in Robb denied the plaintiff's
request for monetary relief because there was other available relief under
the IDEA. 308 F.3d at 1049-50. In Robb, the parents of a fourth-grade
student filed a suit because she was taken away from her class five times a
week for peer tutoring with junior high and high school students. Id. at
1048. The court ruled that ultimately the money would be used for
assistance, such as counseling and tutoring, which could be provided
through the school district. 308 F.3d at 1049-50.
The situations in Charlie F. and Robb are very similar to that of Lori
Busch. Like the student in Robb, Ms. Busch was subjected to peer tutoring
without supervision of a certified teacher, (R. 4) and like Charlie F., Ms.
Busch was placed in a situation that permitted, and possibly created, an
arena for ridicule. (R. 4). Attending peer-tutoring sessions in a courtyard
open for observation caused Ms. Busch to be scorned by her fellow
students because she was being taught by students who were often younger
than she. (R. 4, 18). The main difference between this case and Charlie F.
and Robb is the fact that the students in those situations were only in the
fourth grade and could seek relief, other than money, that would rectify
their injuries. Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 992; Robb, 308 F.3d at 1049-50. The
plaintiffs in those cases could likely seek counseling and professional
tutoring through the school system. Ms. Busch, on the other hand, has
graduated and does not have such administrative remedies at her disposal.
(R. 3). Furthermore, unlike Charlie F., Ms. Busch still suffers from the
mental injury she sustained. (R. 5) In Charlie F., the plaintiff had adapted
well and was doing fine under the direction of his new school. 98 F.3d at
990-91. Ms. Busch, on the other hand, still suffers emotional and mental
distress from being referred to as "Loser Lori" by her peers. (R. 4). The
only relief that can make her whole is monetary damages to help her
recover from her emotional problems. (R. 5). Since Ms. Busch is seeking
relief that is not available through the IDEA, her only means of remedy is
to file a judicial proceeding; therefore, exhaustion would be futile. See
Covington, 205 F.3d at 917 (holding that exhaustion is futile when the
injured party has already graduated from high school, his injuries are in the
past, and money is the only remedy that can make him whole).
Although in Frazier, the courts ruled that allowing students to forgo
exhaustion of administrative procedure would create an opt-out device for
students to wait until after graduation and then seek money damages, that is
not the case here. See Frazier, 276 F.3d at 63. In Frazier, after graduating
from high school, a former student with learning disabilities filed suit under
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§ 1983, seeking monetary damages for her ill treatment and sexual
harassment while attending school. Id. at 57. The First Circuit held that a
former student seeking monetary relief must exhaust administrative
procedures before filing a civil action even though monetary relief is not
available under the IDEA. Id. at 61. The court reasoned that exhaustion is
not futile when a party is seeking relief unavailable under the IDEA
because the administrative process is advantageous in that it allows
administrative agencies and education experts "an opportunity to correct
their own errors," "it potentially avoids the need for judicial involvement,"
and it enables educational experts "versed in the educational needs of
disabled students" to develop a factual record. Id. at 60-61. Furthermore,
the court stated that allowing a graduated student to file a suit without
exhausting administrative proceedings would create an opt-out device and
encourage students to wait until after graduation "to dispute the adequacy
of their educational programs . . . in the hope of recovering money
damages." Id. at 63.
Likewise, the court in Alachua County School Board stressed the
importance of exhaustion when deciding whether a hearing impaired
student should receive monetary damages based on IDEA violations by her
prior school. 84 F.3d at 1378-79. In Alachua County School Board, the
student's parents removed her from the school district because she was
segregated from other students, and then filed a suit under § 1983 before
ever seeking any type of administrative redress. Id. at 1378. The court
denied her relief because she did not exhaust administrative remedies. Id.
at 1378-79. Furthermore, the court found the plaintiffs argument that she
did not have to exhaust the process because she moved outside the district,
to be unpersuasive. Id. at 1379. The court ruled that parents could not
unilaterally bypass the administrative process by simply moving their child
to another school district. Id.
In Frazier, the court pointed out its fear that by allowing a student to
bypass administrative remedies, it would be encouraging other students to
wait until after graduation to challenge the adequacy of their educational
programs. 276 F.3d at 63. However, the Sixth Circuit has recognized the
importance of looking at the unique individual facts of a specific case in
determining whether exhaustion is futile. See Covington, 205 F.3d at 917.
Although the facts of Ms. Busch's situation are similar to those of the
aggrieved parties in Frazier and Alachua County School Board, there are
some distinguishable differences. First, there is no evidence that Frazier or
the student in Alachua County School Board ever made any attempt at
using the administrative process to alleviate the problem. Frazier, 276 F.3d
52; Alachua County Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376. Ms. Busch, on the other hand,
did attempt to remedy her situation by speaking with her teacher, Mr.
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Edwards, numerous times about her dissatisfaction with the courtyard
tutoring sessions and her wish to discontinue those sessions. (R. 4). Mr.
Edwards never responded to Lori Busch's requests (R. 4), which likely led
her to believe that her educational program could not be changed. Also,
looking at the specific facts of Ms. Busch's case, there is no evidence that
she intentionally waited until after graduation to file her suit. The
Defendant-Petitioners required Ms. Busch to attend peer-tutoring sessions
for three hours each morning even though it was not a part of her
Individualized Education Program (IEP); however, the DefendantPetitioners never informed her parents about the change in her curriculum
and her IEP was never reviewed. (R. 4). Ms. Busch's parents were never
able to bring an administrative complaint while she was in school because
they were not aware that the problem existed. (R. 4). There is no evidence
that they intentionally waited to bring the suit in order to get monetary
relief, but because they were uninformed about the issue, monetary relief is
now the only relief that can make Ms. Busch whole. (R. 5).
The courts in Frazier and Alachua County School Board pointed out
the rationale behind exhaustion when making a determination about
foregoing the requirement; however, that rationale is not as strong when
being applied to Ms. Busch's case. In Frazier, the court stressed the
importance of permitting educational experts to be involved in developing
the record because they would be factfinders "versed in the educational
needs" of disabled students. 276 F.3d at 61. This rationale is not as strong
when the aggrieved party is a former student who is no longer in need of
the educational assistance that the Defendant-Petitioners have to offer. (R.
3). A court would be more versed in the issue of granting monetary relief
than would the administration since monetary relief is not available under
the IDEA and not a part of the administrative process. See 20 U.S.C. §
1415(d)(2). Another advantage of exhaustion, which was pointed out in
Frazier and Alachua County School Board, is that by using the
administrative process, judicial proceedings can be avoided. Frazier, 276
F.3d at 60; Alachua County Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d at 1378-79. Although this
rationale may be true in most situations, it is not applicable when a plaintiff
is seeking relief that is not available under the IDEA. Because Ms. Busch
has already graduated high school and can only be made whole through
monetary relief, the issue will ultimately end up in the judicial process
because monetary relief is not available under the IDEA. It would be futile
to require her to go through IDEA proceedings because the administrative
process would be incapable of providing her appropriate relief due to the
nature of her injuries and the fact that she has already graduated. See
Covington, 205 F.3d at 918.
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Lori Busch should not be required to exhaust the administrative
process set forth in the IDEA before filing suit under § 1983 because she
has already graduated high school and she is seeking relief that the
Defendant-Petitioners are unable to provide her; therefore, exhaustion is
futile.
II. THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE
DEFENDANT-PETITIONERS' FAILURE TO RENEW A MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AT THE CLOSE OF ALL OF
THE EVIDENCE BARS A POST-VERDICT MOTION FOR RENEWED
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
At trial, the Defendant-Petitioners made their motion for judgment as
a matter of law at the close of Lori Busch's evidence but not at the close of
all of the evidence. This court should affirm the district court's judgment,
which denied the Defendant-Petitioners' renewed motion for judgment as a
matter of law since the court is bound by the plain language of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). The Defendant-Petitioners violated Rule
50(b) because it requires that judgment as a matter of law be renewed at the
close of all evidence in the case. See Mathieu v. Gopher News Co., 273
F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 2001).
The only deviation for which
noncompliance with Rule 50(b) has been excused is when the court takes a
defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law (made before the close
of all the evidence) under advisement and does not rule on the motion
before the case is submitted to the jury. See Szmaj v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
291 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2002). When the court does not take an earlier
motion for judgment as a matter of law under advisement, the defendant
fails to satisfy the requirements for the only exception to Rule 50(b), and
the defendant has therefore waived its renewed motion for judgment as a
matter of law. See Mathieu, 273 F.3d at 777. The proper standard of
review to determine a district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a
matter of law is de novo, "applying the same standards as the district
court." Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1289 (11 th Cir. 1999).
A. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF RULE 50(B) CLEARLY
STATES THAT A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW MUST BE MADE AT THE CLOSE OF ALL EVIDENCE BEFORE
A RENEWED MOTION IS PERMISSIBLE.
When a defendant moves for judgment as a matter of law at the close
of the opposing party's case and subsequently presents additional evidence,
the defendant must move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of its
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case to be able to renew its motion under Rule 50(b) and to thus fully
preserve error. See Mathieu, 273 F.3d at 776; see also Redd v. City of
Phenix City, 934 F.2d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir. 1991). Therefore, this court
should join with other circuits that have adopted a strict interpretation of
the rule, and hold that the Defendant-Petitioners did not adhere to the
language of Rule 50(b). Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
reads, in relevant part:
If, for any reason, the court does not grant a motion for
judgment as a matter of law made at the close of all the
evidence . . . the movant may renew its request for
judgment as a matter of law by filing a motion no later than
10 days after entry of judgment ....
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (emphasis added). A strict reading of Rule 50(b) is
supported by the advisory committee's interpretation of the rule: "A motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict will not lie unless it was preceded
by a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) advisory committee's note (1963 Amendment); see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) advisory committee's note (1991 Amendment)
("This provision retains the concept of the former rule that the post-verdict
motion is a renewal of an earlier motion made at the close of the
evidence.") (emphasis added). Based on the conclusions of the advisory
committee, courts have strictly interpreted the plain language of Rule 50(b)
by requiring that a motion for judgment as a matter of law be made at the
close of all evidence in order to be preserved for post-trial consideration.
See Redd, 934 F.2d at 1214; Mathieu, 273 F.3d at 776-77.
In Redd, a district judge granted the defendant's motion for judgment
as a matter of law even though at the close of all the evidence the defendant
failed to renew his motion for judgment as a matter of law. Reviewing the
case, the appellate court held that the district court's holding contravened
the plain meaning of Rule 50(b) and supporting case law: "We are
presented with a particularly clear and mechanical rule of law; the City did
not comply and the district judge may not waive his magic wand
dismissing a procedural requirement as a technicality." Redd, 934 F.2d at
1214. Likewise, in Mathieu, the district judge denied the defendant's postverdict motion for judgment as a matter of law when no motion was made
at the close of all the evidence. Mathieu, 273 F.3d at 775. The appellate
court affirmed the district court's decision, and found that the "language
and traditional application of Rule 50 are clear; objections must be filed at
the close of the evidence to preserve any post-trial challenges to the
verdict." Id. at 777.
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Some circuits have disregarded the plain language of Rule 50(b), in
favor of a more liberal interpretation. Such courts have overlooked the
clear reading of the rule in order to prevent injustice. See Taylor Publ'g Co.
v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 472-73 (5th Cir. 2000). These circuits claim
that strict adherence to the plain language of Rule 50(b) would result in a
"rigid trial scenario" that encourages a jury verdict that is without legal
support. Riverview Invs., Inc. v. Ottawa Cmty. Improvement Corp., 899
F.2d 474, 477 (6th Cir. 1990).
Although these circuits allow a more flexible interpretation of Rule
50(b), Congress did not intend such an interpretation. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
50(b) advisory committee's note (1963 Amendment); see also Fed. R. Civ.
P. 50(b) advisory committee's note (1991 Amendment). When Rule 50
was reevaluated and amended in 1991, the advisory committee deliberately
retained the requirement to move for judgment prior to the close of the
trial. See Szmaj, 291 F.3d at 957. This interpretation is also cited by
recognized authorities on federal practice and procedure. Mathieu, 273
F.3d at 776 (citing 9 James Wm. Moore, et. al., Moore's Federal Practice
§§ 50.20[3], 50.40[1], 50.91[1] (3d ed. 2001)). Thus, the plain language of
the rule still required that the defendant "renew its directed verdict motion
at the close of all the evidence." Mathieu, 273 F.3d at 776. Moreover,
a strict application of Rule 50(b) obviates the necessity for
a court to engage in a difficult and subjective case-by-case
determination of whether a failure to [present] a motion for
directed verdict at the close of all the evidence has resulted
in such prejudice to the opposing party under the particular
circumstances of that case.
Farley Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 786 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th
Cir. 1986). In order to preserve its motion for judgment as a matter of law,
the Defendant-Petitioners had to renew their motion at the close of all of
the evidence. Because they did not do so, this court should affirm the
district court's denial of the Defendant-Petitioners' motion for judgment as
a matter of law.
B. NO ACTION TAKEN BY THE COURT RESERVES A
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A RENEWED MOTION IF THE
DEFENDANT FAILED TO MAKE A MOTION AT THE CLOSE OF
ALL OF THE EVIDENCE.
The defendant bears the burden of making a proper motion for
judgment as a matter of law at the close of all of the evidence in order to
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preserve the right to make a renewed motion after a jury verdict. See
Mathieu, 273 F.3d at 776; Redd, 934 F.2d at 1214. Where the defendant
has made a motion for judgment as a matter of law at some point prior to
the close of all the evidence, but failed to renew the motion at the close of
all the evidence, the defendant has waived its right to make a post-verdict
motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Mathieu, 273 F.3d at 776.
Therefore, this court should affirm the district court's holding and deny the
Defendant-Petitioners' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Rule 50(b) serves two essential purposes: to enable the trial court to
examine all of the evidence before submitting the question to the jury, and
"to alert the opposing party" to any defect in its case, thereby affording it
an opportunity to cure any defects in proof should the motion have merit.
See Farley Transp. Co., 786 F.2d at 1346; see also Taylor Publ'g Co., 216
F.3d at 472. The latter purpose is not achieved if the defendant makes a
motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the plaintiff's case,
but does not renew the motion at the close of all of the evidence after the
original motion is denied. See Szmaj, 291 F.3d at 958. In such a situation,
"the plaintiff may assume that the denial was the end of the matter." Id. By
renewing the motion, the defendant shows "that the denial was not the end
of the matter," and "the plaintiff may ask and may receive permission from
the judge to put in some additional evidence to show that there is a jury
issue." Id. Hence, the plaintiff is not prejudiced by having lost the
opportunity to present additional evidence before the case was submitted to
the jury. Id.
The Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits recognize only one
minor exception where the defendant does not need to restate a motion for
judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence. Id. at 957-58.
These courts have excused strict compliance with Rule 50(b) only where
the court takes a defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law (made
before the close of all of the evidence) under advisement and does not rule
on the motion before the case is submitted to the jury. See Szma*, 291 F.3d
at 958; Giles, 245 F.3d at 482; Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d
1153, 1173 (3d Cir. 1993); Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d
1488, 1500 (9th Cir. 1987). In such a case, "'counsel may reasonably
assume that the court has the motion under continuous advisement and that
[the motion] need not be restated."' See Lightning Lube, 4 F.3d at 1173-74
(quoting Repola v. Morbark Indus. Inc., 934 F.2d 483, 488 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Thus, the plaintiff is aware at the end of trial that the issue is live, and he or
she can put on additional evidence after the defendant's case if deemed
necessary. See Szmai, 291 F.3d at 958. Hence, there is no lost opportunity
to submit additional evidence. See Herrington, 834 F.2d at 1500.
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In Giles, a terminated employee sued his employer for violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act. 245 F.3d at 479-80. At trial, the court
denied the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the
close of the plaintiffs case. Id. at 481. Although the court denied the
motion, it added, "we'll see how we do on that," indicating a willingness to
revisit the issue at the close of all the evidence. Id. at 482. Following the
denial of the motion, the defendant "called only one witness as part of its
case-in-chief." The "witness testified extensively regarding the nature of
the [plaintiff's job and] whether a person with [the plaintiff's] disabilities
would be able to perform the duties required." Id. at 485. The defendant
relied "heavily on the testimony of that witness in its post-judgment motion
for judgment as a matter of law and on appeal." Id.The appellate court
found that:
[I]n light of the close nexus between the issue [in which
the defendant] sought judgment as a matter of law and the
extensive testimony [of the one witness], to entertain
[defendant's] post-judgment motion on this issue despite
[defendant's] failure to comply with rule 50(b) would
unfairly surprise [plaintiff] and thereby would thwart one
of the purposes of rule 50(b).
Id. Thus, the court held that the defendant's "failure to follow the
procedures" of Rule 50(b) "waived its motion for judgment as a matter of
law with respect to [that] issue." Id.
Likewise, in Mathieu, a terminated manager of a news company
brought an action against his employer for disability discrimination. 273
F.3d at 774. At trial, the defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law
at the close of the plaintiff's case-in-chief. Id. at 775. After the court
denied the defendant's motion, the defendant presented its case-in-chief
and the plaintiff took the stand in rebuttal. Id. The defendant "did not
renew its motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all of the
evidence, and the court submitted the case to the jury." Id.The appellate
court affirmed the district court's ruling that refused to grant the
defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 777-78. The
court stated that even if it were to recognize and adopt an exception that
excused noncompliance with Rule 50(b) where the purposes of the rule are
satisfied, the defendant had not satisfied the exception's requirements. Id.
At trial, the defendant's president testified after the defendant had moved
for summary judgment as a matter of law following the plaintiff's case. Id.
The court found that as the defendant's "primary decision maker," the
president's testimony "clearly weighed on the ultimate decision as to
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whether" the defendant regarded the plaintiff as disabled.
Id.
"Consequently, the trial court had no opportunity to examine all of the
evidence before submitting the question to the jury." Id.
The court also did not adopt the defendant's asserted exception to
compliance with Rule 50(b) where:
(1) the party files a Rule 50 motion at the close of the
plaintiff's case; (2) the district court defers ruling on the
motion; (3) no evidence related to the claim is presented
after the motion; and (4) very little time passes between the
original assertion and the close of defendant's case.
Id.(quoting Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648, 656 (8th Cir. 1995)).
Although the defendant satisfied the first requirement by making a motion
at the end of plaintiff's case, it did not satisfy any of the other
requirements. Id. at 777. The district court "did not defer its ruling or
otherwise suggest" that the defendant "need not renew the motion at the
close of the evidence." Id. Also, "evidence concerning the issues of
disability or perceived disability was presented" after the defendant's
motion for judgment as a matter of law. Id_. Moreover, both the defendant's
president and the plaintiff testified on the final day, and "more than 'a very
little time' passed between the court's ruling on the motion and the close of
the evidence." Id.
This court should follow the holdings in Giles and Mathieu and deny
the Defendant-Petitioners' motion for judgment as a matter of law. This
case is similar to Giles, in that the court denied the Defendant-Petitioner's
motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the close of the plaintiff's
case, but indicated a willingness to revisit the issue at the close of all the
evidence. Giles, 245 F.3d at 482. In Lori Busch's case, the judge told the
Defendant-Petitioners, "I am going to deny this motion for now," (R. 21)
which is a clear denial by the Court. Furthermore, the court restated its
denial when it suggested that the Defendants renew the motion at the close
of all of the evidence (when it said, "[w]e may want to re-visit this motion
after you rest your case.") (R. 21) The Defendant-Petitioners, like the
defendants in Giles and Mathieu, did not comply with the Court's proper
suggestion. Giles, 245 F.3d at 482; Mathieu, 273 F.3d at 775. Neither the
district court nor Lori Busch could have been aware that the DefendantPetitioners continued to challenge the sufficiency of Lori Busch's prima
facie case. Thus, it would be unreasonable to believe that Lori Busch's
counsel would reasonably assume "that the court [has] the motion under
continuous advisement and that [the motion] need not be restated." See
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Lightning Lube, 4 F.3d at 1173-74 (quoting People v. Morbark Indus. Inc.,
934 F.2d 483, 488 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Furthermore, following the denial of the motion for judgment as a
matter of law, the Defendant-Petitioners, like the defendants in Giles and
Mathieu, introduced evidence that was closely related to Lori Busch's
cause of action, and therefore it would be unjust not to allow her to submit
additional evidence. See Giles, 245 F.3d at 485; see also Mathieu, 273 F.3d
at 777. Although only one witness testified during the time between the
Defendant-Petitioners' original motion for judgment as a matter of law and
the close of the Defendant-Petitioners' case, the testimony and exhibit
introduced clearly weighed on the ultimate decision as to whether the
education Lori Busch received at Washington High School was
inappropriate and inadequate. Due to the close nexus of that issue to the
testimony of the Defendant-Petitioners' witness Alison Sharper, the
President of the Class of 2002 at Washington High School, as well as
Exhibit A, a policy statement of the Senior Buddy Program at Washington
High School (R. 20-21), it would be unjust to not waive the DefendantPetitioners' motion for judgment as a matter of law. Otherwise, Lori Busch
loses the opportunity to submit additional evidence to support her case. See
Herrington, 834 F.2d at 1500.
The First, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have used a more liberal
interpretation of Rule 50(b) in holding that a defendant does not lose its
right to move for a renewed judgment as a matter of law after the jury
verdict where: (1) the trial court indicated that the defendant's prior motion
for judgment as a matter of law need not be renewed at the close of
evidence and that (2) the evidence introduced after the initial motion was
brief. See Riverview, 899 F.2d at 477. The Second, Fourth, and Fifth
Circuits take a similar view. They require that (1) the trial court indicate
that a defendant's prior motion for judgment as a matter of law need not be
renewed and that (2) the plaintiff reasonably understand, despite the denial
of the defendant's initial motion, that the court's indication means that the
motion is sill a live one and that the plaintiff is free to put on additional
evidence after the defendant's case. See, e.g., Taylor Publ'g Co., 216 F.3d
at 472.
In Riverview, a real estate developer brought a civil rights and
antitrust action against a community development corporation after the
corporation refused to issue industrial revenue bonds for a development
project. 899 F.2d at 476. The appellate court held that the district court
judge "indicated to appellees that renewal of their motion for a directed
verdict was not necessary to preserve their right to move for judgment as a
matter of law. Id. at 478. Furthermore, the appellate court held that the
testimony obtained by appellant after the motion for a directed verdict was
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"brief and inconsequential" to the outcome of the trial. Id. at 478. Much of
this testimony was found to be duplicative of the testimony of the
plaintiff's witnesses, and of minor importance. Id. Thus, the appellate
court held that "the appellee's failure to renew its motion for a directed
verdict at the end of the rebuttal testimony did not preclude the district
court from granting n.o.v." Id.
Likewise, in Taylor Publishing, a school yearbook manufacturer
brought an antitrust action against a competitor. 216 F.3d at 470-71. The
defendant's attorney "indicated that he wanted to present his motion [for
judgment as a matter of law] after [the plaintiff] had concluded its case".
Id. at 472. "The court stated that it would consider the motion timely filed,
but wished to consider it 'after we finish the evidence."' Id. The following
trial day, the court allowed the defendant to orally present its Rule 50
motion. Id. The court "then took the motion under advisement until the
following morning of trial', when the court denied the motion. Id. The
plaintiff then presented its remaining three pieces of deposition testimony,
"and the parties made their closing arguments". Taylor Publ'g, 216 F.3d at
472. The defendant did not renew its motion for judgment as a matter of
law at the close of the evidence. Id. "In light of these facts", the court
found "that any noncompliance by the defendant with Rule 50(b) was 'a
technical, formalistic defect, not a substantive one,' such that it was a "de
minimis" departure from technical compliance with Rule 50(b). Id. "First,
the district court repeatedly expressed its intent to reserve ruling on
[defendant's] Rule 50(b) motion until all evidence had been presented."
Taylor Publ'g, 216 F.3d at 472-73. Also, "the only evidence presented
after the defendant made the Rule 50(b) motion was three pieces of
deposition testimony" which "took very little time to present." Id. at 473.
Moreover, "both the court and the parties were aware of the substance of
Taylor's remaining evidence at the time the motion was argued." Id. Thus,
"Taylor was not "blindsided" by [the defendant's] post-judgment renewal
of the motion" for judgment as a matter of law. Id.
The courts in Riverview and Taylor Publishing demonstrated that
although Rule 50(b) requires renewal of a motion of judgment as a matter
of law at the close of all evidence, the requirement has not traditionally
been strictly enforced. These circuits have allowed "deviation[s] from full
compliance with Rule 50(b)'s mandate" that a motion for judgment as a
matter of law be made at the close of the evidence if the deviation "was
minor and did not frustrate the rule's purposes." See Taylor Publ'g, 216
F.3d at 473. In Lori Busch's case, the Defendant-Petitioners' failure to
renew their motion after the close of all evidence was not a minor deviation
from the requirements of Rule 50(b) and it frustrated one of the main
purposes of the rule, which is to alert the plaintiff to any defect in its case,
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"thereby affording it an opportunity to cure any defects in proof should the
motion have merit." See Giles, 245 F.3d at 482 (quoting Bohrer v. Hanes
Corp., 715 F.2d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 1983)). The court never explicitly
indicated that the Defendant-Petitioners' original motion for judgment as a
matter of law need not be renewed at the close of evidence. On the
contrary, when the Defendant-Petitioners made their motion at the close of
Lori Busch's case-in-chief, the court denied their motion and did not take
any motion under advisement. Furthermore, the court did no more than
suggest that the Defendant-Petitioners renew their motion for judgment as a
matter of law at the close of all of the evidence (when it said, "[w]e may
want to re-visit this motion after you rest your case"). (R. 21) There was
no guarantee that the motion was still a live one at the close of all the
evidence, and the Defendant-Petitioners did not comply with the Court's
proper suggestion to renew their motion after they rested their case.
Moreover, unlike Riverview and Taylor Publishing, the evidence
introduced after the Defendant-Petitioners' initial motion for judgment as a
matter of law might have been brief, but it was not inconsequential to the
outcome of the trial. This evidence followed directly after the denial of the
Defendant-Petitioners' judgment as a matter of law, where the Court stated
that Lori Busch's evidence established a genuine issue as to whether peer
tutoring deprived her of a free and appropriate education. (R. 5) This issue
pertains to the testimony introduced by the Defendant-Petitioners after the
denial of their motion. The testimony of Alison Sharper and the content of
Exhibit A was not duplicative of any evidence introduced previously in the
trial. Therefore, unlike the plaintiff in Riverview, Lori Busch was not
properly put on notice so that she could introduce additional evidence after
the close of the Defendant-Petitioners' case. The Defendant-Petitioners'
noncompliance with Rule 50(b) frustrated, rather than promoted, the
purposes of the rule. Real justice can only result if this court affirms the
district court's decision and denies the Defendant-Petitioners' renewed
motion for judgment as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Lori Busch respectfully requests that this
court affirm the lower court's decision in finding that Ms. Busch need not
exhaust the IDEA administrative process in order to bring her § 1983 suit
for monetary damages and denying the Defendant-Petitioners' motion to
dismiss and motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Respectfully submitted,
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